

OCTOBER 1950

# ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

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**Korea--A Report to the Nation**

From the President's Message

**Army War College Training**

**The Old Soldiers' Home**

**Our Military Highway Transport**

**Problems of Airhead Operation**

**National Guard in Federal Service**



**RUSSIA'S MILITARY DEVELOPMENT**

The Historical Background of the Soviet Army



# ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST



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## RUSSIAN ARMY HISTORY

Continuing a policy of providing information on foreign armies of general interest to military readers, The DIGEST begins with this issue a series of articles on the Soviet Army. Military organizations previously reported in The DIGEST are "The Philippine Army" (April 1948) and "The Canadian Army" (July 1948).

## TO THE FRONT

Behind the truck convoys streaming to the front, bearing cargoes of ammunition and fuel for the tanks' advance, lies a well-defined pattern of staff planning. How the Transportation Corps' Military Highway Transport Service tackles the complex problems of overland supply is described in the article appearing on page 48.

## AIRBORNE ASSAULT

Ever since the dawn of aviation, the air as an avenue of surprise assault has challenged the imagination of military strategists. In last spring's Exercise Swarmer, the feasibility of seizing an airhead and developing it into an island of offensive action was tested in full-scale maneuver. In this issue, Major General Otto P. Weyland, USAF, outlines the major problems besetting the Air Force commander assigned the mission of creating an airhead behind enemy lines.

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# THE SOVIET MILITARY ORGANIZATION ITS HERITAGE AND DEVELOPMENT

The contribution of Imperial Russia and its leaders until the time of the 1917 Revolution and the creation of the Red Army. Background for an evaluation and understanding of the Soviet Army today.

## I: From Tsar to Commissar

**G**RAY masses of soldiers rode on the roofs of overcrowded trains. The trenches were emptying and the roads were filled with soldiers marching eastward. Its discipline dissolved and its members demoralized by the Bolshevik revolution, the Imperial Russian Army was streaming homeward. Amid this revolutionary chaos of 1917, the Imperial Russian Army disintegrated and from its remnants the Red Army was created.

The winter of 1917-1918 marked a significant turning point in Russian military development. Traditions, uniforms and patterns of the past were stamped into the ground to make way for the new army of Communism. At its inception on 23 February 1918, the Red Army was to be a *new* army, unpolluted by the symbols and influences of Tsarism. This was a naive Bolshevik idea but contrary to circumstance and history, for the new army had to strengthen its motley force of workers, partisans and peasants with cadres from the Imperial Army.

Twenty-five years later in the midst of World War II, the





# ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY



Red Army dug deep into past history to revive Tsarist uniforms, customs and traditions in order to bolster the morale of its sagging forces. The very army that during the Revolution and Civil War had mocked and degraded Tsarist officer uniforms and insignia, in 1942-1943 restored the epaulets, guardist titles and other symbols it had hated so violently.

Actually the present-day Soviet Army reflects a military heritage which began centuries before the Russian Revolution. Armed forces of Russia have been waging war for seven centuries, but the Russian army really originated with Peter the Great's creation of a Western-type army.

In the 17th Century, the Russian army was a conglomeration of varied military elements. The *streletsy* or palace guard regi-



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"Peter the Great" from an engraving by Henriquel DuPont.

ments were the core of the army which included regiments of foreign mercenaries as well as the levies of Russian noblemen with their peasant foot-soldiers. This army was not an effective one, but Princess Sophia, regent for the young Tsar Peter, sought popularity and glory in a war against the Crimean Tartars and Turks, so the army marched. The campaign ended in catastrophe for the Russian arms and the need for reform was recorded in Russian history.

During the regency of his sister, Sophia, Tsar Peter lived at the village of Preobrazhenskoe near Moscow. The banished Tsar, later to be the architect of a new Russia, gradually built up a bodyguard—a “play army” initially composed of courtiers and servants. The “army” took form in two regiments, the Preobrazhenski and the Semyonovski. Like many units of the age, these regiments were essentially military organizations composed of political party members, and it was with these instruments of political as well as military power that Peter overthrew Sophia’s Guard (the old *strelety* regiments), deposed her as regent and elevated himself to power in 1689. This purge, like the many to follow in Russia, was bloody and violent in pattern. Hundreds of *strelety* were hanged or beheaded with Peter personally wielding the axe on some of the heads. For five months Moscow had to stare at the bodies hanging from the Kremlin walls.

Tsar Peter had inherited a disorderly medieval levy whose provisioning and administration had been left practically to chance. By personally supervising the reorganization of the old army, Peter the Great gave foundation to a more modern military body. Peter’s two original regiments served as a pattern in organization, equipment and training for additional units as he expanded his army. To support the army the Tsar built up his backward nation’s industry. Artillery in particular received the Tsar’s special consideration. Thus began the traditional “best arm” of the Russian army.

In the course of Peter’s reign, conscription for the army was put on a territorial basis. Each province was obliged to recruit, clothe, quarter and pay the military units assigned to it. In placing these obligations on the working class, Peter was no less rigorous with the gentry. He combined all nobles in a unified caste and made service in the army a lifelong duty for the nobility. At the same time, soldiers who rose to the rank of superior officers became noblemen. In effect, state rank took precedence over hereditary rank.



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"Suvorov's March Through the Alps" by Surikov depicts an episode in the Russian campaign against the French in 1799.

The army was one of contradictions and extremes. Some of the nobility served in the ranks, yet they were allowed servants. There were regulations forbidding these privates from exhibiting too much luxury although their retainers formed a bulky regimental train. Social equality, while visible on some surfaces, was not real with the lower classes performing the actual military labor.

A great many of the officers who drilled Peter's army were foreigners and their influence was one of bringing to the Russian army facets of several European armies. Thus the Russian army assumed western characteristics and was slow to develop its own definite form. However, the more purely Russian Guard regiments were the stabilizing core of the army, the military implements that backed the throne or put rulers on the throne.

Throughout Russian history each Tsar endeavored to build up a new regiment which would guard him personally. Peter III and Paul I created units before they reached the throne and afterwards they merged these units into the army. The Ismailov Guards and the Life Guard Cavalry regiments were created by Empress Anna Ivanovna and the Pavlov Life Guard Grenadiers were established by Paul I. Behind these guard units, however, stood the masses of other men who gave Russian armies their combat weight.

Peter the Great did not build up his army to let it stand idle. The first test of his new military force was against Charles XII of Sweden—the greatest conqueror of the era. In the battle of Narva in November 1700, some 8000 well organized Swedish troops routed 40,000 Russian soldiers who in panic stabbed many of their foreign officers to death. Only the Semyonovski and Preobrazhenski regiments defended themselves with fatalistic energy. Fortunately for Peter, he was given time to strengthen and further train his army in minor campaigns against weak foes.

While Charles XII campaigned in Poland, Peter's soldiers captured a few Swedish fortresses near the Neva River, thus giving Russia an outlet to the sea. Russian slavery built the capital of St. Petersburg on the marshes of the Neva.

Disposing of the Poles, Charles XII invaded Russia where his legions again met those of Peter. In a battle at Hallosin, 3000 of Charles' men made seven charges to defeat 20,000 Russians. By this time the unruly Don Cossacks—formerly a rampart of Russia's frontier—were in revolt and they subsequently joined the Swedes.



King Charles attacked through the Ukraine intending to take Moscow. Peter's army harassed the Swedish expeditionary force while the Russian population scorched the earth in the path of the enemy. Reaching Poltava, the Swedes stormed the city only to be repelled by the local garrison until Peter's army arrived. In the battle that followed on 27 June 1709 the Russian army was victorious. The Swedish troops and Russian Cossacks were effectively destroyed.

In Russia the death of an emperor or empress often signaled a violent struggle for power, especially when there was doubt as to which relative was to assume regency or the throne. When Peter the Great died in 1724, the Senate argued over the choice of his successor. The debate was cut short by the roll of drums, for Catherine, Peter's second wife, had enlisted the support of the Guard regiments. These units intimidated the Senate into proclaiming this foreign-born woman the ruler of Russia in 1725.

The next renowned European conqueror to feel Russian military might was Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). Advancing into East Prussia the Russian army defeated the Prussians at Gross-Yaegersdorf on 19 August 1757. A year later, almost to the day, the Russian army fought the indecisive battle of Zorndorf, but on 1 August 1759 Russian arms bested Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf. Little more than a year later the Russian army entered Berlin, pillaged the treasury and destroyed the arsenals.

In 1761, Peter III, a worshipper of Frederick the Great, ascended the throne. In 1762 he freed his nobility from the obligation of consecrating themselves to the service of the state. He also introduced Prussian drill to the Russian army and outfitted it in Prussian uniforms. German military specialists who had been banished during the previous reign were recalled to service. Russian troops absorbed considerable brutality but responded in drill to these harsh foreign martinetts. Thus a foreign military system was again superimposed on the Russian army, but it hardly produced effective results. The army was still seeking a character of its own. It had not long to wait for a change.

From this era emerged one of Russia's greatest military leaders, Alexander Suvorov, whose axiom "Hard on the training ground—easy in battle," is felt in the Soviet Army today. Observing the Seven Years' War, Suvorov drew certain con-





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"After the Battle of Borodino" by the artist Vereschagin portrays the Russians defending Moscow against the French in 1812.

clusions which later had impact on the Russian army—and on all of Europe.

The extraordinary successes of Frederick the Great had cast a spell over the military minds of Europe. His drill, tactics, strategy and even uniforms were slavishly imitated—but without the same effective combat results. The incompetence of the Russian army, even though victorious against Frederick, impressed Suvorov who perceived that Russian military strength lay in the peasant composition of the army—not in the officers or the way they handled their troops. Suvorov brought new and revolutionary ideas to the Russian army and in addition he became one of its most daring and outstanding leaders.

In Suvorov's age the men in the ranks were often those serfs



"On the Great Road" by Vereschagin depicts the retreat of the French army from Russia in 1812.

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whom the nobility could best spare for the army. They were anything but the best manpower. Drunkenness, idleness, dishonesty, indifference to dress and discipline were common characteristics of these soldiers. The discipline needed to control these men depended largely on brutal punishment. It was here that Suvorov become a reformer who sought fairer treatment for the soldiers while at the same time spurring soldier initiative, godliness and cleanliness. Suvorov was also original in keeping his troops on a war footing by hard and realistic training. He encouraged liberty, fraternity and equality while at the same time setting a new example by sharing the discomforts of his troops. Suvorov thus stood out prominently in an era when officers believed that soldiers should be harshly treated.

Suvorov drew up a manual of military training called *The Science of Victory*. This document, written in a simple language the soldiers could understand, dealt with military elementals and essentials: "How to march," "Where to attack," "How to camp" and "How to determine enemy strength."

"Every soldier must know his maneuver" was a new and revolutionary doctrine for any one to teach in the Russian army; heretofore soldiers had not been allowed to have minds of their own.

"Fire opens the gates of victory." It was Suvorov's practice to open battle with artillery fire, but for the final outcome he had most faith in the infantryman's blade. "The bullet's a fool; the bayonet is the boy," read Suvorov's manual.

Beginning his career as a private and culminating it as the generalissimo, Suvorov trained troops for battle, not for the parade ground. The offensive was the cornerstone of his strategy; it carried him across the Alps—an achievement that won for him Napoleon's admiration. To this century Suvorov's march across the Alps is recorded on Swiss General Staff maps with the legend "Suvorov's Route in 1799."

In his forty years of active service in wars with Turkey and the Polish Confederacy, Suvorov was never defeated. It is not unusual, therefore, to find him held in great esteem by the Soviet Army whose Order of Suvorov is awarded to the higher commanders and their deputies for the conduct of offensive type actions which result in enemy defeat. However, in contrast to Suvorov's ideas of equality, the present day decoration honoring him is bestowed in three different classes

depending on the rank of the recipient. It is generally reserved for only those of highest rank.

Suvorov never pitted his talents against Napoleon but one of his pupils, also a present-day hero of the Soviet Army, did. Mikhail Kutuzov is honored today by the Soviet decoration bearing his name and profile. In contrast to the Suvorov decoration for offensive action, the Order of Kutuzov is awarded to those commanders who successfully carry out operations in the face of enemy superiority. It is a defensive type decoration stemming directly from Kutuzov's delaying action against Napoleon when the invading French army left behind it a trail of Russian corpses.

Throughout its history the Russian army relied heavily on its elite troops, the Cossacks and the Guards. Especially before serfdom was abolished, the average Russian soldier viewed the Cossacks with envy and secret hostility, for the Cossacks were free men who originally elected their military commanders. Warriors by tradition and choice, the Cossacks expanded the frontiers of Russia. They were especially useful to the Tsarist government in garrisoning and policing Poland and quelling with quick and often brutal action the internal disturbances of Russia.

In the one hundred years between 1814 and 1914, Russia waged three major wars—the Crimean Campaign (1853-1856), the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).

Inept leadership and antiquated armament helped bring about Russian defeat in the Crimean War.

Despite military bungling the Russians managed to win the war against the Turks, but ill-equipped and ill-clothed Russian soldiers died needlessly from frostbite and exposure. It was the sacrifice and endurance of the lower ranks which permitted the Russian Army to win this conflict.

Soldiers' endurance compensated for many of the administrative, tactical and logistical deficiencies of the Russian Army in 1905—but the giant army of Russia was badly defeated by the smaller Japanese forces. Following this ignominious defeat, far-reaching reforms were projected in the Russian Army but these were never effectively carried through.

The Russian Army, like the nation it served, developed slowly. Russia spent money freely to maintain a giant military force. However, the money was not always well spent. At the turn of the century, the Imperial Russian Army was a pon-





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British troops storm a Russian fort during the Crimean War, 1855.

derous military machine. It was a tradition-conscious army, burdened with lavishly uniformed and bemedalled officers too many of whom did not know their jobs thoroughly enough. The best officers from the standpoint of professional excellence were to be found in the engineer and artillery branches.

By the outbreak of World War I, Russia had a great mass of reservists. While they responded rapidly to mobilization orders, they were insufficiently trained. For all its ponderous size and many deficiencies the Russian Imperial Army swung quickly into motion at the beginning of World War I. Just sixteen days from the time war was declared and Russia began mobilization, her armies were moving on the offensive against German military forces. But as the Russian Army marched into combat it was never to return from the front as an organized military body. It was entering its most tragic era.

Superficially the Russian Army gave the impression of great strength, but serious weaknesses lay concealed in and behind the long gray columns of men. The army was unbalanced with its excessive proportion of infantry and weakened by a leadership that failed to grasp the logistical demands bred by its armed masses. Russia's factories could not produce sufficient shells for the giant army whose large forces were committed in regions lacking the road and railroad nets needed to support them. This lack of ammunition and arms

and the inadequate transportation facilities eventually had their impact on soldier morale.

Despite its earlier defeat by Japan, the Russian Army had clung to old practices and systems and had failed to undertake needed reforms. The Guard regiments, provided with extra funds for equipment, had squandered the rubles on peacetime luxuries such as dress uniforms instead of machine guns.

Many officers were militarily talented but the bulk of them were not. Four years of high school and several months of military schooling were sufficient to place the epaulets of commissioned rank on almost any shoulders. Reservists were relatively untrained for the combat tasks ahead of them and regulars were unskilled in the wartime aspects of their profession. As a group, the top-ranking officers were not progressive but adhered to ideas of the past. At least two of them, Samsonov and Rennenkampf, who were leading the vanguard of Russian forces in the field, were in personal conflict. Their enmity was so great that these two commanders would not speak to each other. Yet in 1914 the armies under the command of these two officers were selected to make a joint effort. Rennenkampf, advancing from the east, and Samsonov, advancing from the south, were to overrun East Prussia. Russia, pressed by the French government, hastened its offensive. The two armies advanced without effective preparation and coordination to be annihilated in turn—Samsonov at the Battle of Tannenberg and Rennenkampf at the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes. A quarter of a million German troops decisively defeated Russian forces totaling 500,000 men.

In the German offensive a year later, Russian soldiers resisted splendidly but suffered severe losses. By this time Russian field artillery was often without sufficient ammunition. The army was driven eastward.

Nevertheless, Russia still showed signs of strength when in 1916 her army launched an offensive on a 250-mile front against the Austrians. Russian dead were piled on the battlefields as evidence that her army could make enormous sacrifices. Russian losses even amazed the battle-hardened von Hindenburg. The Russians gained some satisfaction in the capture of more than 400,000 prisoners.

Meanwhile there were disturbing signs within the army as serious deterioration set in. In December 1916, General Brusilov cited the VII Siberian Army Corps as having arrived on the Riga front "entirely under the influence of propaganda."






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Russian forces engage the Austrians in World War I, 1914.

Rebellious ranks bayoneted a company commander and the soldiers of the corps refused to attack. After continued defeats on the battlefield, revolution—fanned by the propaganda of agitators—broke out and the last Emperor of Russia abdicated in March 1917.

The Duma set up a Provisional Government headed by Prince Lvov. The Provisional Government, lacking men capable of strong leadership, failed within the year. In April, Nicolai Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks and avowed enemy of the Provisional Government, arrived in Russia from Switzerland, having crossed Germany in a sealed railway car. On 17 May Kerensky became Minister of War and set about to prepare a general Russian offensive. Five days later Kerensky



Keystone View Company

Troops draw rations at a field kitchen during the Russian Civil War, 1919.

approved the order known as the "Declaration of Soldiers' Rights," a document which echoed the notorious "Order Number 1" of the Petrograd Soviet and destroyed the last vestiges of discipline in the army.

To represent the government in the army, Kerensky appointed political commissars. Caught between the soldiers' committees (which had sprung into being at the beginning of the Revolution) and the commissars, the army officers were unable to maintain their authority. Active fighting ceased and desertion began on a large scale. The Russian Army was going home. Yet amid this disintegration and chaos, Kerensky continued to organize a military offensive. In July 1917, the offensive operation of the "reorganized" army got under way on the Austrian front. Despite initial successes, whole regiments refused to carry out military orders; some even left the front. The reinforced enemy launched a counteroffensive and the Russian Army was routed. Some 1,500,000 men were listed as "deserters." The army, as Lenin said, "had decided the question of war or peace with its feet."

In November 1917 (by the old Russian calendar, it was still October) the "October Revolution" took place. Lenin and his Bolshevik party under the slogan of "peace, bread and land" seized governmental power. In December an armistice was signed between Soviet Russia and Germany. After unsuccessful peace negotiations between Russian and German representatives, Germany resumed operations against Russia in February 1918.

From the day they seized power it was obvious to Lenin and his followers that they must organize an army loyal to the Red cause if they were to retain the leadership of the country in the face of the double threat of counter-revolution and renewed German operations.

The Red Army grew slowly from confused beginnings.

One of the first acts of the Soviet government was to abolish the epaulets as a symbol of the old regime. The Bolsheviks had ordered the soldiers in existing units to elect their own new officers with the result that illiterate soldiers became regimental commanders. The majority of the Tsarist officers turned against the Revolution and virtually all such officers were suspected of being counter-revolutionaries. Hundreds of officers were murdered by mobs. The officers of the old regime were held in contempt by the soldiers, yet in the confusion of revolution and growing civil war their talents



В.И. Ленин, Л.Б. Сталин и М.С. Калинин на VIII съезде РКП(б) 1919

Stalin, Lenin and Kalinin together in 1919. The picture is from a captured German film collection.

Library of Congress

were needed. Many of them were engaged as military specialists by a government which held them all suspect.

The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) dates its official origin from 23 February 1918 when elements of this new army defeated invading German units in an engagement near Pskov and Narva. This day is celebrated annually as "Soviet Army Day."

But the hastily assembled Red forces were in no condition to halt the German advance permanently. The Bolsheviks were forced to accept the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which resulted in the loss of considerable Russian territory.

The Red Army of that time was a motley force of workers, remnants of the Tsarist Army, sailors, Cossacks and partisan groups totaling less than 100,000 men. Its officer cadre consisted partly of former Tsarist officers and partly of Communist activists. Hardly was the Red Army created when the Bolshevik propaganda machine gathered momentum. Party cells were organized and from April 1918 a political commissar was assigned to each regiment. The principle of electing commanders was discarded at the same time.

As rapidly as they could the Soviets built up a new cadre of commanding officers selected from the proletarian rank and file. Thus after about a year there appeared a new type of commander—often illiterate—who only months earlier had been a factory worker or peasant. Blunt self-assurance compensated for his lack of military knowledge since he had the full support of party dictatorship. In view of the lack of qualified unit commanders, Trotsky favored the continued use of the Tsarist "military technicians" to bolster the Red Army.

Behind the walls of the old military academies the Bolsheviks found scholarly officers who, being Tsarists, were reluctant to support the Revolution and Civil War. These had to be impressed, sometimes at gun point, into Soviet service. The talents of these officers—more college professors than military men—were badly needed. In a similar category were the old General Staff officers. They worked for the Soviets despite hostility toward the new system and a lack of interest in politics. In these officer groups were Kamenev and Tukhachevsky who represented the old nobility, the latter subsequently being rewarded for his service to the Soviets by execution. Shaposhnikov was still another Tsarist officer who wielded considerable influence in the newly created Red Army.

After the October Revolution, Russia denied her obligation

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Cwazy!



to continue fighting during World War I. Beset with internal strife the divided nation was torn by a civil war that was a series of mobile campaigns engaged in by units small in proportion to the vast areas over which they had to operate.

As the internal struggle lengthened, the Red Army increased in size until by the end of the conflict in 1921 it had attained a peak strength of 5,300,000, including service units.

During the civil strife, the Red Army operated partly along guerrilla lines and even the regular forces assumed a partisan character. The Soviet government was against the guerrilla theory for troop organization and tactics, favoring instead a regular army along modern lines. However, military necessity during the civil conflict forced it away from application of the idea. Certain political forces favored the partisan form of military establishment. Dispute on these issues lasted well beyond the civil war.

This bitter strife bled the Red Army but brought forth a new crop of Russian commanders and new military doctrine born of the peculiarities of the conflict. This type of war was far from that of the sluggish, massed movements the Russians had known in combat against Germany. Also it was a war of extreme hatreds and brutalities. It is not surprising therefore to find the victors groping for new military concepts while at the same time being guided and somewhat inhibited in viewpoint by the type of combat they had experienced.

## AID

This is the first of a series of articles on the history and background of the Soviet Army. The next article will trace the reorganization of the Red Army into its present-day counterpart.



# REPORT ON KOREA

*Extracts from the President's Report to the Nation,  
2 September 1950*

**T**WO MONTHS ago, Communist imperialism turned from the familiar tactics of infiltration and subversion to a brutal attack on the small Republic of Korea. When that happened, the free and peace-loving nations of the world faced two possible courses.

One course would have been to limit our action to diplomatic protests, while the Communist aggressors went ahead and swallowed up their victim. That would have been the course of appeasement. If the history of the 1930s teaches us anything, it is that appeasement of dictators is the sure road to world war. If aggression were allowed to succeed in Korea, it would be an open invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere.

The other course is the one which the free world chose. The United Nations made its historic decision to meet military aggression with armed force. The effects of that decision will be felt far beyond Korea. The firm action taken by the United Nations is our best hope of achieving world peace.

What is at stake is the free way of life—the right to worship as we please, the right to express our opinions, the right to raise our children in our own way, the right to choose our jobs, the right to plan our own future and the right to live without fear. All these are bound up in the present action of the United Nations to put down aggression in Korea.

We cannot hope to maintain our own freedom if freedom elsewhere is wiped out. That is why the American people are united in support of our part of this task.

The United Nations was able to act as it did in Korea because the free nations in the years since World War II have created a common determination to work together for peace and freedom.

When the Communist movement turned to open, armed aggression in Korea, the response of the free nations was immediate. Fifty-three of the fifty-nine members of the United Nations joined in meeting the challenge. Thirty have already

pledged concrete aid to the United Nations to put down this aggression.

Thus far the brunt of the fighting has fallen upon the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the United States. In addition, naval forces from Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and New Zealand have been and are now in action under the United Nations command. Fighting planes from Australia, Canada and Great Britain have joined the operation.

Ground forces have been offered by Thailand, the Philippines, Turkey, Australia, France and other countries. Some British troops have landed in Korea and more are on their way. All of these will serve under the flag of the United Nations and under the United Nations commander, General MacArthur. . . .

Right now the battle in Korea is the front line in the struggle between freedom and tyranny. But the fighting there is part of a larger struggle to build a world in which a just and lasting peace can be maintained.

That is why we in the United States must increase our own defensive strength over and above the forces we need in Korea. That is why we must continue to work with other free nations to increase our combined strength.

The Congress is now acting on my request to increase our program of arms aid to other free countries. These nations are greatly increasing their own efforts. Our aid is not a substitute, but is an addition to what they themselves do.

In Western Europe alone, there are more than 200,000,000 people. Next to ours, their industry is the world's greatest workshop. They are joining with us to develop collective forces for mutual defense—our defense as well as their own.

The Armed Forces of the United States are a key element in the strength of the free world. In view of the threats of aggression which now face us, we shall have to increase these forces and we shall have to maintain larger forces for a long time to come.

We have had about one and a half million men and women on active duty in our Army, Navy and Air Force. Our present plans call for increasing this number to close to three million and further increases may be required.

In addition to increasing the size of our Armed Forces, we must step up sharply the production of guns, tanks, planes and other military equipment. We shall also have to increase

our stockpile of essential materials and expand our industrial capacity to produce military supplies.

We have the ability and the resources to meet the demands which confront us. Our industry and agriculture have never been stronger or more productive. We will use as much of this economic strength as is needed to defend ourselves and establish peace.

As we move forward to arm ourselves more quickly in the days ahead, and as we strive with the United Nations for victory in Korea, we must keep clearly in mind what we believe in and what we are trying to do. We also want the rest of the world to understand clearly our aims and our hopes.

We believe in the United Nations.

We believe the Koreans have a right to be free, independent and united—as they want to be.

We do not want the fighting in Korea to expand into a general war. It will not spread unless Communist imperialism draws other armies and governments into the fight of the aggressors against the United Nations.

We hope in particular that the people of China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the United Nations and against the American people.

We do not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves.

We believe in freedom for all the nations of the Far East.

We do not believe in aggressive or preventive war.

We want peace and we shall achieve it.

We want peace not only for its own sake but because we want all the peoples of the world, including ourselves, to be free to devote their full energies to making their lives richer and happier. We shall give what help we can to make this universal human wish come true.

We will not fail. The task which has fallen upon our beloved country is a great one. In carrying it out, we ask God to purge us of all selfishness and meanness and to give us strength and courage for the days ahead.

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O Lord God when Thou givest to Thy servants to endeavor any great matter, grant us also to know that it is not the beginning, but the continuing of the same until it be thoroughly finished that yieldeth the true glory.

*From a prayer by Sir Francis Drake*

# THE PATH AHEAD

By

GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY

*Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*

**I**T IS NOW apparent that the aggression in Korea was well planned and well prepared and that militant international Communism inspired the northern invaders. It is also apparent that Communism is willing to use arms to gain its ends. This is a fundamental change and it has forced a change in our estimate of the military needs of the United States.

We have come to the only conclusion possible to a free people. We have had enough of aggression and we have finally drawn the line across its path.

We may in this way succeed in forcing the respect which we now know conciliation, appeasement and weakness can never bring. The cost will be heavy—but not as heavy as the war which we are now convinced would follow our failure to arm.

We are planning to speed up our military requirements in an orderly fashion. Certainly we will not go so slowly that we fail to achieve our aim. On the other hand, we are trying to follow the old adage, "Make haste slowly." We will build rapidly, firmly and permanently for as long as the need exists.

We are faced with three requirements. First, in order to win the war in Korea, we must get more men and equipment over there as soon as possible. This means that the pipeline of essential supplies and personnel must be started flowing and it must be kept flowing for as long as may be necessary.

Second, although the forces we have sent to meet the immediate threat in Korea still may be considered as part of our overall defense, the effect is a reduction in that defense. We must therefore replace those units sent from other areas, particularly the United States, and thus restore our military capabilities.

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*From a statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the House Committee on Appropriations, 26 July 1950.*

Third, it is now evident that we must have an even greater flexibility of military power in the United States itself—not only for our own protection, but also to give us a ready, highly mobile standby force which we can bring to bear at any threatened point in the minimum time. . . .

As a background, I would like to analyze the force requirements of the present situation.

The first requirement is to build up the present forces in Korea to war strength and battle capability. For example, the infantry regiments fighting there have only two battalions. A third will be supplied as quickly as possible.

Second, the divisions in the United States which have furnished battalions to Korea, and new units activated under this authorization, will require replacement units of their own. For example, the tank battalions taken out of the armored division must be replaced.

Third, units overseas will be built up to war strength. Most of them have been running at 65 per cent in general, even in the regiments and battalions that have been part of the reduced divisions.

Fourth, the units in the United States which have been kept at approximately 60 per cent strength will be built up to the 85 per cent strength that is essential for a state of readiness. Normally there are many military occupations within a division that need not be filled on Zone of Interior duty. While serving in the United States, for example, artillery sections do not need the full ammunition crews that they would need in battle.

Finally, the pipeline from the United States to units overseas and to those fighting in Korea will also have to be filled.

I have used Army examples, but the same applies to the Air Force and the Navy all the way from the front lines back to the units operating with reduced complements inside our continental limits. Similarly, in the Army, Navy and Air Force the equipment and materiel for these units have to be brought up to strength—battle strength, including sufficient additional equipment for battle losses in the combat zone; war strength for those top priority units overseas; and approximately 85 per cent for those units in the Zone of Interior.

This program of requirements has not been devised on short order. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been considering the build-up of our Armed Forces as part of a long-range plan

which is still in effect and which is only accelerated and enlarged by the present action in Korea. . . .

Our goal for the remainder of fiscal year 1951 is to continue the normal programs which have already been requested for that year, to meet the requirements of the Korean situation and to improve the global posture of the Armed Forces. It is essential that in these times our readiness should be somewhat greater than that which existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. It will include minimum essential forces for maintaining the security of Japan.

It is my belief that we can build up our forces to such an extent that they will be effective insurance against a further breach of the peace. And if they are not successful as insurance, we shall at least be that much more ready to meet a new attack.



U. S. Army Photograph

End point of the pipeline. Troops of the 1st Cavalry Division move into front line positions in Korea.



# COMMAND TRAINING AT ARMY WAR COLLEGE

By

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH M. SWING

**T**HE Army War College, senior institution of the Army educational system, reopens this month after ten years' suspension, with the first course being held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.



The reopening of the College is another step in the progress of the Army school system. Shortly after the successful completion of World War II and as a result of experience gained from three years of postwar operation of Army schools, an Army board made a study of the entire school system to bring it within the structure of the new Department of Defense. The board's report as approved in October 1949 recom-

mended among other provisions that the Army War College be reestablished.

A Department of the Army directive of 11 October 1949 set forth the following pertaining to the Army War College: "Selected graduates of the Regular Course at the Command and General Staff College after another period of duty will attend the Army War College. This course will be approximately ten months in duration. The scope of this course will include instruction in the duties of the commanders and staffs of the higher Army echelons not included in schools previously attended, such as the army group, theater army headquarters, zone of interior, and Headquarters, Department of the Army, with emphasis on the Department of the Army. This course

*MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH M. SWING is Commandant of the Army War College. He commanded the 11th Airborne Division in the Pacific Theater in World War II.*

will be designed to emphasize Army technique necessary to carry out the Army's mission as a part of the Department of Defense. . . ."

As the Army War College has been inactive for the last ten years, only the older officers of the Army realize the important role it played in the past and have an understanding of its mission and functions.

The Army War College was originally conceived and founded under the direction of President McKinley's Secretary of War, Elihu Root. Profiting from the sad lessons of the Spanish-American War, Mr. Root worked for the establishment of an Army institution where selected officers would be given instruction to prepare them for duties as commanders and staff officers in the highest positions of the Army.

Through Mr. Root's efforts, the Army War College was officially established in 1901. The missions of the College, as conceived by Mr. Root, are forcefully set forth in his



U. S. Army Photograph

Major General Joseph M. Swing, Commandant, Army War College.

recommendation for the establishment of an Army War College, ". . . composed of the heads of the staff departments, properly so called, and a number of the ablest and most competent officers of high rank in the Army . . . these officers to be detailed for service in the college for limited periods, so that while the college shall be continuous in records, character and performance, it shall be the duty of this body of officers to direct the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire the information, devise the plans, and study the subjects indicated, and to advise the Commander in Chief upon all questions of plans, armament, transportation, and military preparation and movement. In addition, officers . . . should be detailed for some fixed period during service to receive instruction at this college in the science of war, including the duties of the staff, and in all matters pertaining to the application of military science to national defense; that provision should be made for the continuance of such instruction by correspondence after the expiration of the period of each officer's detail, and all officers should be invited and entitled to present, by written papers and reports, as a part of the regular course . . . the results of their investigations, explorations, reflections, and professional and scientific work, and upon such special subjects as may be prescribed by the college . . ."

The Army War College was thus founded as an institution designed to provide instruction in the higher fields of the military arts and sciences. In its early days, only those officers who showed the greatest proficiency were considered for assignment to it. This had a high morale value in that it gave new incentive to enterprising officers. This procedure remains in effect today in the reconstituted College.

Because of the declaration of war on 6 April 1917, classes were suspended until after World War I. Again in 1940, when our forces were expanded to meet the threat of the European war, the activities of the College were temporarily suspended. In 1946 the buildings and properties of the Army War College at Fort Lesley J. McNair were turned over to the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in furtherance of the unification program of the Armed Forces.

The 1950-51 course of the Army War College will be held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It is expected that the College will move to a permanent home at Carlisle Barracks, Penn-

sylvania, as early as practicable after the completion of the current academic year.

In order to carry out its mission, the curriculum of the College has been divided into three major phases covering, respectively, the Army and national security, current Army problems and war planning.

The objectives of Phase I (The Army and National Security) are to broaden the background of the student with respect to United States organization for national security and particularly with respect to the organization of the Department of the Army; to develop a wider knowledge of the national policies, plans and objectives of the United States, with particular reference to the international aspects thereof; and to increase the student's ability to cope with problems involving national policy.

Phase II (Current Army Problems) has a twofold objective—to familiarize the student with current Army problems, programs, policies and operations; and to develop the student's ability to analyze current Army problems, thereby increasing his ability to propose and present solutions to these problems.

Phase III (War Planning) is designed to increase the student's familiarity with the techniques of war planning and to develop the student's ability to solve the military problems inherent in war planning, to include strategic mobilization and logistic aspects.

The basic method of instruction is through the solution of problems in committees, followed by the presentation of committee solutions for class-wide discussion. Formal instruction designed to give general background to the student body is confined to a large extent to material presented by guest lecturers.

This method of instruction, combined with the curriculum, is arranged so that the student will develop a broad understanding of our national security problems, the Army's peacetime problems and the problems of war planning. Together, the curriculum and the methods of instruction are designed to foster creative and objective thinking on the part of the student while at the same time furnishing him with a broad but integrated picture of the problems of the Army as a whole.

The greatest part of the student's time is spent in solving problems. During an academic year, each student will solve approximately fourteen problems of a committee type. In addition, he will prepare one individual thesis and will make

oral presentation to all or a portion of the class. During the 1950-51 course approximately sixty problems will be presented to the class as a whole for solving by committees. Each committee will normally consist of from six to eight students assisted by a faculty representative. These committees will remain intact until a solution has been determined.

Generally the preparation of a problem involves five distinct steps—selection of the subject, determination of the purpose, establishment of the scope, selection of guest speakers, and development of a bibliography.

Guest lecturers provide basic information on subjects under study. The analyses and conclusions presented by these lecturers afford important source material for the students in their studies. Normally, lectures are approximately fifty minutes in length, followed by a break, after which a discussion period is conducted.


The staff and faculty of the Army War College at present consists of forty officers. The faculty, headed by the commandant and deputy commandant, is composed of selected officers who are qualified in the various aspects of the military arts and sciences, either from broad study or war experience, or both. Representatives from the Navy, Air Force and Department of State are assigned to the staff and faculty as advisers.

The primary duties of the faculty are to determine the nature and scope of the problems, to assist the students in the selection of reference material and to give them general guidance in their studies and deliberations. The faculty neither formulates nor suggests categorical solutions to any of the assigned problems.

The first student body of the new Army War College is composed of approximately 100 senior officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Department of State. The average student at the College is a colonel or a lieutenant colonel (or comparable grade) with between 15 and 21 years of service.

The new Army War College bases its instruction on the belief that only through critical analyses by informed persons can real progress be made in the military art. Through a sound curriculum and through advanced methods of instruction, it expects to develop leaders who will exemplify the 40-year-old motto of the Army War College, "*Prudens Futuri*"—Thoughtful of the Future.





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# PROBLEMS IN AN AIRHEAD OPERATION

By

MAJOR GENERAL OTTO P. WEYLAND

**O**N THE night of 5 March 1944, gliders of the First Air Commando Force cut loose from their mother transports deep in Japanese-held Burma. The troops and equipment they carried established the "first" United States airhead and, together with subsequent Air Commando operations, provided the "only" combat history of United States airhead operations.

Before anyone takes violent issue with the "first" and the "only," let me define the "airhead" upon which these statements are based. An airhead is an objective or a series of objectives well within enemy territory which can be taken only by airborne assault and which must be supplied and reinforced entirely by air until the successful completion of the operation.

It is not the purpose of this article to recite the military actions which have contributed to the modern concept of airhead operations. It is important, however, that it be understood that the concept finds little basis in experience in airhead operations. Rather, it stems from an analysis of similar operations (standard airborne, the Hump, the Berlin Airlift), an evaluation of the capabilities of present-day aircraft, and an



USAF Photograph

MAJ. GEN. OTTO P. WEYLAND

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MAJOR GENERAL OTTO P. WEYLAND, USAF, directed the XIX Tactical Air Command which provided air support for the Third Army in the European Theater in World War II. Assigned to the Tactical Air Command, he is currently on temporary duty with Headquarters, USAF.

acknowledgment of the existence of effective air-transportable weapons and equipment of the Army.

Visualize, if you will, the airborne phase of Normandy combined with the Berlin Airlift plus active air opposition, and you have a fair picture of an airhead operation. It requires no stretch of the imagination to see that such an effort presents problems—many of them.

First of all, such an operation has a staggering transport aircraft requirement. Major General James M. Gavin has stated that in his opinion a corps is the smallest unit that offers promising tactical prospects in the establishment of an independent airhead.\* Colonel Joseph N. Bell has stated that the airlift of a corps would involve 31,400 tons and that its daily supply requirements would amount to 3000 tons.† Add to this the required engineers, receipt and distribution personnel, airdrome operations and maintenance personnel and fighter defense units and we begin to see the immense airlift problem that faces us.

Besides the problem of securing sufficient transport aircraft, departure airfields must be selected which have the facilities necessary to provide for the complicated marshalling of aircraft and Army and Air Force units destined for the airhead. This is no small problem. Hundreds of airplanes and thousands of officers, soldiers and airmen must, from start to finish, be at the right place at the right time. This, of course, requires more than facilities. A major problem in organization is involved.

It is the theater commander—or perhaps even the Joint Chiefs of Staff—who, having no other method of securing a “must” objective in the overall strategic scheme of the war, decides that an airhead operation will be carried out. A Joint Task Force will most likely be organized and given the airhead mission and the units with which to carry it out. It is this Task Force which does the detailed planning which puts the right men, the right equipment and the right airplanes all at the proper place at the proper time.

Let us assume that our Joint Task Force has been allocated the required number of transport aircraft, adequate departure airfields and assurance that sufficient combat and supporting units will be provided. We now have something to work with but our work has just begun.

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\* *Infantry Journal*, December 1946.

† *Air University Quarterly Review*, Winter 1948.

Before there can be any hope of success we must establish air superiority. Our fighters and bombers must clear the sky of the enemy, and not until this is accomplished to a sufficient degree can we risk the employment of our slow, unarmed transports with their valuable cargoes of men and equipment.

While the battle for control of the air is progressing, our reconnaissance units will be working overtime to select the exact drop zones and landing zones. They must keep the Task Force supplied with up-to-date photo coverage and reports on enemy air and surface activity over the entire area. The photographs must be studied in detail to select phase lines, to determine the capacity of the existing airfields and to select sites for the construction of airstrips if that should prove necessary. Landing field capacity must be adequate to handle the maximum effort of our available transport aircraft and the operations of our airhead fighter planes.

Assuming that the capacity of the airhead landing fields is satisfactory, we must then select the personnel and equipment to keep our transports flying the maximum number of sorties day and night in all weather. This means that we must plan to install instrument landing equipment and have it operating early in the action. It means that the right number of receipt and distribution personnel must be selected, trained and equipped so that aircraft turn-around time is kept to a



USAF Photograph

A tactical air control center directs airhead operations.

minimum. If we have too many men for this job it will cause an extra airlift burden—for they too are consumers.

As our reconnaissance and intelligence reports are studied over a period of time, a picture of the enemy's capabilities begins to come into focus. We can make our "final" selection of combat units and determine the priority with which they will be introduced into the airhead. Having selected the combat units, the next problem is to determine the number and kind of supporting units they require. How many and what kind of engineers, for example, are needed? Can we afford to base fighter planes in the airhead or, conversely, can we afford not to base them there? What will be the fighter defense requirement and what is the offensive requirement? Many educated guesses have to be made—guesses based on an estimate of the enemy's capabilities.

The method of utilizing protective fighters is itself a major consideration. A wrong guess as to where to base them and in what strength may make or break our airhead operation. Besides the fighter units, an effective control system must be installed. In a recent exercise in which an airhead was established, close tactical air support was enhanced in the initial stages of the operation by Forward Air Controllers. These men parachuted into the area with the airborne units and established contact with and control of the air alert fighters in the area in a matter of minutes. As the airhead expands, the Tactical Control System too must grow so as to employ effectively our air effort from both an offensive and defensive standpoint.

So far, no mention has been made of the weather man, but we can be certain that he has been slaving over his charts and his crystal ball. He is the man who will exercise considerable influence in the selection of D-Day. What kind of weather do we want? Good weather—good enough to allow the assembly of our horde of troop carrier aircraft and their escort fighters. We may be able to use a "Berlin Airlift Stream" later on, but initially for the airborne phase of the operation we want as large a gathering in as small a space as possible. We therefore want weather good enough to allow the employment of mass and we want it to stay good until instrument landing systems can be installed in the airhead.

From the time the decision is made to conduct the airhead operation until the day it is established, there is one important problem for which the most careful plans must be made


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—namely, the maintenance of security. No whisper of what or where must reach the wrong ears. Like standard airborne operations, the airhead by its very nature depends on complete surprise for success. An informed enemy could lay a trap, the consequences of which are not nice to think about. It is almost certain that if the enemy knew our plans, the airhead would fail before it was fairly started. Deception has been employed effectively in past military operations, however, and might well prove valuable in planning for airhead operations.

In summary, these are some of the basic requirements in an operation. First, air superiority must be established, or all thought of airhead operation must be abandoned. Second, there must be effective intelligence in order that an accurate picture of the enemy's capabilities may be presented. Any plans made without an understanding of these capabilities might well be suicidal. It is the key to the selection of units, weapons, equipment and the airhead itself. Third is the obvious requirement that sufficient airlift and combat and supporting units are available to conduct the operation. Fourth, security must be airtight. Like airborne operations, the establishment of an airhead requires for its success the advantage



USAF Photograph

This C-124 transport is capable of transporting a light tank.

of surprise. Fifth, weather must be carefully analyzed. The weather forecast plays an important part in the selection of D-Day, good weather being required for the employment of mass in the initial stages of the operation. These are a few of the major problems.

Some military thinkers feel that the logistic support required to establish and maintain an independent airhead exceeds our capability. The logistic support required is indeed enormous and limits the selection of areas suitable for an airhead. It is conceivable, however, that sites might be selected with a complex of airfields already built or utilizing, for example, natural features of the terrain such as the bed of a huge dry lake, which would require little if any heavy engineering equipment or construction materials.

The modern concept of airhead operations, as mentioned earlier, is based in part on an evaluation of the capabilities of present-day aircraft. Meanwhile, the weight-lifting capacity of transport aircraft is increasing steadily. Cruising speed, too, is increasing and this in effect increases lift capacity since it allows more sorties in a given period. The reversible propeller can stop a heavily loaded transport in a short distance. The same transport empty, or nearly so, can take off from the airhead in a shorter distance so that smaller airfields may be used.

The modern concept of airhead operations also is based in part on the acknowledgment that the Army is succeeding in its efforts in making modern weapons and equipment air transportable—with less weight and bulk. The recoilless rifle having the weight of a .50 caliber gun and the wallop of a 75mm howitzer is an example of the success of this program.

As the Army program to make its weapons and equipment air transportable and the Air Force program to increase the lift capacity of its aircraft progress, the airhead operation becomes a potent capability—a capability that a belligerent nation cannot take lightly.

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We will never coerce or enslave other peoples to fill our needs. Yet we are challenged today by ruthless forces ready to sacrifice great masses of slaves and puppets in their efforts to destroy us. Our survival depends upon our superior ability to understand, control and employ the laws and the forces of nature.

*General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force*

## NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED

**A**S AN aftermath of the Korean conflict, the President on 31 July issued a call ordering four National Guard divisions into Federal service. In the midst of their annual summer training period, these divisions were the first to be mobilized among the 27 Guard divisions preparing for M-Day missions (although numerous non-divisional units had received earlier alerts). Personnel were given thirty days to wind up their civilian affairs, and units used this period to recruit their organizations to strength.

The divisions, pictured here in recent encampments, were sworn into Federal service at their home armories and were mobilized for intensive training. With advance parties paving the way, men and equipment moved to their new stations.

The 28th Division from Pennsylvania went to Camp Atterbury, Indiana. The 40th Division composed of men from Southern California was stationed at Camp Cooke, California. Guardsmen from Rhode Island, Vermont and Connecticut composing the 43d Division moved to Camp Pickett, Virginia. Oklahoma's 45th Division gathered at Camp Polk, Louisiana.

Two regimental combat teams—as well as numerous undesignated non-divisional units—also were called into Federal service. The 196th RCT from South Dakota moved to Camp Carson, Colorado, while the 278th RCT from Tennessee began training at Fort Devens, Massachusetts.

Early in September, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, announced that four fighter bomber groups and one tactical reconnaissance group of the Air National Guard would be called to active duty. Actual designations of these units will not be announced.

The ground training activities depicted on the following pages are currently being reenacted at accelerated tempo as units go through their warm-up paces, preparing for the tasks ahead. Their immediate mission, as set forth by General Mark W. Clark, Chief, Army Field Forces, is "to prepare to fight as trained units in the shortest time possible."

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All photographs in this section supplied by National Guard divisions.

# 28TH DIVISION



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


General Mark W. Clark, Chief, Army Field Forces, inspects an honor guard of the 28th Division. Below, members of the Keystone Division train at Indiantown Gap. At left, the 28th assembles for Governor's Day ceremonies.






# 40TH DIVISION






Tanks are manned by 40th Division soldiers at Camp San Luis Obispo, California. Below, members of an Artillery battalion train on 155mm howitzers. At left, an Infantry regiment on parade.



# 43RD DIVISION



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Crews from a Connecticut company fire 81mm mortars. Below, Vermont infantrymen of the 43d Division fire machine guns on the range at Pine Camp, New York. At left, the New Englanders mass colors.




# 45TH DIVISION



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Above, high physical standards are maintained in preparing for mobilization. Below, men of the 45th apply the Division's Thunderbird insignia to helmet liners. At left, troops pass in review at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.



# OUR MILITARY HIGHWAY TRANSPORT SERVICE

By

COLONEL ERNEST A. SUTTLES

**H**IGHWAY transportation by motor vehicle—a development of the present century—has not only revolutionized modern life; it has had a far-reaching impact on modern methods of fighting wars. The short period encompassing World Wars I and II marked the extraordinary growth on the one hand of gigantic highway systems for the pleasure and profit of the private individual while, on the other hand, it witnessed the thorough mechanization of the world's armies. This was not a parallel growth. While industry concentrated on giving the public better vehicles and better roads on which to use them, the military centered their aims on development of a tactical weapon with the off-road maneuverability of the horse it had replaced.

Hitler's blitzkrieg armor driving west into France proved the new weapon. The same armor driving east into Russia, however, ran away from an inadequate highway support and, in bogging down, demonstrated the military folly of neglecting the essential supporting role of mass transportation.

The United States Army did not repeat Hitler's mistake. Highway transportation, Americans knew, was more than just motor vehicles and highways. It was both—and then more. It was the private family car and also the gasoline station on the corner. It was the bus that took you to work and the big trucks that drove by night. It was a network of rural roads, city streets and trunk highways leading everywhere. It was the stop sign at the intersection and also the traffic and highway departments of government. It was an interdependent grouping—every part vitally dependent on the others.

"When Hitler put the war on wheels he ran it straight down our alley." General Brehon B. Somervell's words in 1942

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COLONEL ERNEST A. SUTTLES, TC, is Chief, Highway Transport Service Division, Office of the Chief of Transportation.

expressed the faith of Americans in their ability to do wonders on wheels—on highways. That faith gave birth to the concept of a military highway transport service, patterned generally on our commercial trucking industry and roughly paralleling the military railway service. In Italy the Fifth Army put the idea through successful tests; in France the Red Ball Express proved it.

Behind the lightning-like advances of Bradley's and Patton's armies, the truck convoys of the Red Ball Express rolled relentlessly day and night to keep the supplies moving. "When one looks back upon those amazing days," said General Eisenhower, "it seems well nigh incredible that at no period, up to the time when we stood on the threshold of Germany, was the momentum of the drive retarded through lack of essential needs. The spectacular nature of the advance was due in as great a measure to the men who drove the supply trucks as to those who drove the tanks."

The Highway Transport Service of the Transportation Corps was not a pre-planned organization. It grew out of war necessity. That necessity was the demand for putting the vehicles back on the highways for which they were designed and where they could literally "roll."

Although the details varied, a frequently recurring pattern of military operations gave rise to the need for the new service. Initially the mobility of armies had been based on standard tactical vehicles in the hands of using troops. In the conquest of enemy territory combat troops could move fast and far, but there remained an ever-widening gap between them and their base of supply. With the railways bombed out or else destroyed by a retreating enemy, the job of bridging this gap had to be done extensively by highway. But the task presented a complexity of problems arising from the fact that the highways were already being taxed to the limit. After the passage of the combat columns, the abnormal load on wartime highways most often consisted of a chaotic combination of refugees fleeing to the rear and mixed military vehicles attending to the routine supply of their individual units. The correction of these conditions required far-reaching measures.

For military operations the Army had to provide its own organization to replace the peacetime systems of civilian transportation found in populous areas. Under wartime conditions much more than routine tasks are involved. Always there is the extreme urgency of tactical requirements, the necessity of

moving troops and supplies in a manner that will permit them to operate as tactical teams. Then, too, there is the likelihood that existing rail and other transportation facilities normally used in civil life might be completely unavailable for military operations. By its very nature, moreover, the task of supplying an army is more difficult than supplying a giant metropolis of equal size, because while the population of a city is comparatively static that of an army is constantly moving. Thus early in World War II there existed a recognized military need but no service to render it; a mission but no responsible command; a mode of transportation without equipment and without a right-of-way over its own travel net.

The Highway Transport Service (originally designated "Motor Transport Service" in the theaters) was established to meet that need and to resolve the problems it presented. Its mission was to provide the forces with a general cargo and personnel hauling service, by highway and related overland means. In its organization, principles as old as the history of war were drawn upon, putting to military use equipment and practices as modern as America's trucking industry.

Mobility—the principle of war most closely allied to an army's ability to achieve victory—is as applicable today as it has been since earliest times. Mobility is a number of things. It includes *maneuverability*, the ability to negotiate terrain; *range*, the ability to travel far; *speed*, the ability to move quickly; and *capacity*, the ability to carry a maximum load.

Only by a selective combination of these factors can a mili-

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**f:** Amphibious trucks bring sling loads of cargo ashore where it is transferred to waiting trucks.

U. S., Army Photograph



tary force gain the mobility necessary for both tactical employment and logistical support. Animal transport of the past, for example, had great tactical maneuverability and little else. Railways, when put to military use, added range and capacity to the army's mobility. Air transport added speed but lacked capacity. Only automotive transport had that combination of maneuverability, range, speed and carrying capacity essential to the many needs of the modern land army.

The mobility of the motor vehicle is enhanced by its adaptability to many and varied uses. This adaptability cannot be achieved in a single type of equipment, nor can it always be achieved by mounting different bodies on a single standard chassis. One type of equipment may have excellent maneuverability for off-road going; another may have speed and cargo capacity but be restricted to improved roads; and another may have range and speed but be limited to passenger or other service. Flexibility can only be accomplished by a number of types, each designed to accomplish specific functional purposes or to transport specific types of loads. American industry always knew that. It took World War II to demonstrate the principle under combat conditions.

With the exception of tactical types, commercial industry has developed vehicles suitable for every military need. These vehicles roll off assembly lines pre-tooled for any emergency and are tested and improved every day in the tough commercial market. They are made to do a specific job, whether they be passenger bus, pick-up truck or tractor-semitrailer. The most

- 2:** Long-haul convoys, operating on close schedules, carry the supplies forward over the express highways.

U. S. Army Photograph





satisfactory device yet provided for combining a choice of cargo body types with a standard power chassis is that work horse of the trucking industry—the tractor-semitrailer. Industry knew that and the Army learned it in operating its Red Ball Express across Europe.

The Military Highway Transport Service turned to industry in World War II because it recognized in the military situation parallels that had already been met by the highway, automotive and trucking specialists of America. It saw in its Army car companies a parallel with the taxi fleets of cities; in its heavy truck companies a parallel with the interstate truckers; in its administrative fleet of buses a parallel with the scheduled service of transit firms; in its supplementary units a parallel with public highway and traffic agencies.

Making more efficient use of the vehicles on hand, the Highway Transport Service during World War II got permission to load tactical vehicles above their off-road rated capacities when used on the highways. For example, the standard 2½-ton cargo truck was allowed loads up to five tons when put to highway use. This greatly reduced the number of vehicles required, thereby helping to relieve the military traffic problem.

The Highway Transport Service also asked for and received heavy tractor-semitrailer units similar to those found so successful in commercial trucking. The 10-ton stake and platform semitrailer, towed by a 4-5 ton truck-tractor, was extensively used during the latter part of World War II and again in

**3:** At transfer points en route, semitrailer equipment is exchanged, and other truck-tractors continue the relay forward.

U. S. Army Photograph



connection with the Berlin Airlift. This equipment and proposed heavier types will open up unlimited possibilities for increased loads, greatly expanded long-haul services and drastic reductions in personnel and operating requirements.

To speed its wartime operations, the Highway Transport Service was assigned specific routes for its own use. Over these routes the truck convoys could be dispatched at high speed day and night. Along these express routes check points were set up in direct communication with the headquarters. Through them the entire route could be controlled in a manner similar to that of a modern railroad but with unlimited flexibility in adjusting to tactical change.

The Highway Transport Service selected and adapted to its operations commercial methods which would assure the most economical use of equipment and personnel—such measures as rotating driver shifts on a round-the-clock schedule, individual dispatch and shuttle methods for short hauls, and truck terminal and relay procedures in accomplishing long hauls.

These developments did not stop with the end of World War II. They have continued in the Office of the Chief of Transportation where they are reflected in new organization, new equipment and new procedures for a more effective highway transport service adapted to the fast changing requirements of modern warfare.

A hypothetical situation in a possible future war illustrates the work which might be performed by the various units of

- 4:** From the rear areas on through the communications zone, the convoys roll day and night.

U. S. Army Photograph



the Highway Transport Service as they deliver the goods from ports to troops at the front.\*

The armored divisions of the Nth Army have just completed a drive which has taken them far into enemy territory. They need gasoline and oil, plenty of it, before resuming their pursuit. The infantry divisions are taking up new positions but a counterattack from the flank is expected at any time. They need ammunition and need it in a hurry.

While air transport could deliver emergency items and assist in evacuation of casualties, it can come nowhere near delivering the great bulk of goods needed. Rail transport, which might under other circumstances bear the main share of the burden, is out of action due to aerial bombardment of its facilities and destruction of rolling stock wrought by the retreating enemy. That leaves only the highways—and they are severely blocked by thousands of refugees on foot and prisoners being moved to the rear.

The Theater Commander takes action to break the deadlock. His Highway Transport Division is assigned the mission of getting the critically needed supplies through at all cost—all the way from the Base Section at the rear up to the Army dumps in the combat zone. The Division reserves and clears of all casual traffic a two-lane route which cuts across Communications Zone sectional boundaries and over which it exercises traffic regulation and dispatch control. Only the vital

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\* Certain deviations from actual doctrine have been made for security reasons.

**5:** They roll on into the Army areas and forward to division dumps.

U. S. Army Photograph



supply traffic is allowed on this route, in strict adherence to a schedule of priorities established by the Theater Commander. Through its Highway Regulation Points strategically located along the route, the operations section of the Division keeps posted on the progress of all movements and makes any adjustments which may be required by the changing tactical needs.

Under the Division, important administrative functions are divided among Highway Transport Groups. Each of these groups has four Transportation Truck Battalions to which are assigned six or more truck companies. Besides performing specific segments of the operation, the battalions augment the maintenance services of the truck companies during peak load operations.

The operation gets under way. The Amphibious Truck Companies operate on the landing beaches and at the ports. Their vehicles, the DUKWs, bring loads of cargo in from ships lying at anchor a mile or so off shore. At transfer points strategically located along the coast, these loads are lifted by rotating cranes and swung around to waiting trucks. The DUKWs continue to shuttle between ships and transfer point, receiving their dispatch orders by loudspeaker from a control tower which overlooks the water operation.

The Heavy Truck Companies pick up the cargo at the transfer points or at dumps and pipe-heads near the ports. All companies are equipped with similar 5-ton truck-tractors. The types of semitrailer equipment used, however, may vary according to the commodity they haul. Some companies, for

**6:** And finally, at distribution points close behind the fronts, supplies are delivered to the fighting troops.

U. S. Army Photograph



example, have been provided with "tankers" for hauling bulk petroleum. Others use "reefer vans" for transporting perishables. Still others have "low-beds" to move tanks and other heavy items. Most Heavy Truck Companies, however, are equipped with the newest (proposed) type 20-ton stake and platform semitrailers suited to long highway movements.

Operating from a truck terminal at the origin of the express route, shuttle tractors with empty semitrailers are individually dispatched to the amphibious transfer points or beach dumps. There they receive loaded semitrailers in exchange for unloaded ones. Upon their return to the terminal they "spot" the loaded semitrailers in a convoy assembly area and then return for others. Line tractors, which operate over the long haul, pick up the loaded semitrailers and move out on close schedules and in convoy formation. They move loads forward a half-day's run. At established transfer points they are met by a convoy coming from the opposite direction with empty semitrailers from a previous haul. Loaded semitrailers are exchanged for empty ones. The first convoy then returns to the terminal of origin to complete a full day's run. The second convoy carries the loaded semitrailers forward to another transfer point or to the destination terminal. This operation is continuous with convoys operating day and night, relaying the goods forward.

At the destination terminal the line tractors drop their loaded semitrailers and are made ready for another trip. Shuttle tractors take over in a manner just the reverse from that at origin and deliver the loads to forward supply dumps.

Located along the express route or at the terminal are special teams or units which furnish necessary auxiliary service such as automotive servicing, highway traffic regulation, route marking and the like. They also provide additional drivers or mechanics as needed by the operating companies.

With fuel for the armored units given first priority, the heavy truck convoys hauling petroleum tankers are scheduled past the destination terminal and relayed forward direct to the armored divisions. Then suddenly the enemy attacks. Small arms ammunition for the infantry now receives priority. On instructions from movement control, the Highway Division sends orders to its check points to hold the petroleum and other convoys and let the ammunition convoys pass. In this way actual adjustments in schedules are made as fast as they are recorded on the march graphs back at headquarters.



The infantry divisions take up scattered positions in hazardous terrain which has very few good roads. Now the Light Truck Companies take over. Strict security measures are put into effect and blackout and other passive defense is enforced. The 2½-ton trucks of the light companies receive loads from the army dumps and are dispatched in small march units which move forward by bounds to the division ammunition dumps. In a short time the ammunition stocks have been replenished. A counterattack gets under way and the enemy is repulsed.

This type operation is only one of the many possibilities that may erupt into reality in future war. In all probability, however, the situation may be vastly different, for future methods of warfare are being developed now—not only on the military planning tables and maneuver fields but in the industrial world as well.

Acutely aware of the new lessons to be learned from industry, the Highway Transport Service Division maintains constant liaison with commercial users of automotive equipment and with those who plan and build the Nation's highways. Many of its officers participate in on-the-job training with industry, while Reservists from the trucking industry are brought on active duty for training with the Division. Through its Reserve program, the Division maintains affiliations with 300 units sponsored by trucking firms and other highway and traffic agencies. These affiliated Reserve units constitute an efficient and thoroughly trained nucleus to be mobilized immediately in case of emergency.

The Division keeps abreast of new developments through correspondence and exchange of information. As quickly as new methods and procedures are evaluated, tested and approved, they are included in doctrine and training literature. New items of vehicle design are incorporated in plans for development of Army equipment; and the troop organization for highway transport units is revised as necessary to incorporate the latest in equipment and operating methods.

Throughout its planning, the Highway Transport Service Division maintains as its goal the ever-increasing mobility of our Armed Forces—mobility that is geared to the fast-paced requirements for support of troops in battle, utilizing equipment that will stand the test on the proving ground of war.

# THE UNITED STATES SOLDIERS' HOME

By

COLONEL D. C. CORDINER

**S**ERGEANT George Williams who fought the Indians in the Dakota Territory back in the '80s and who was born, the record says, in 1850, is the oldest of the 1500 members of the United States Soldiers' Home, in Washington, D. C. All during his lifetime, there has been a Soldiers' Home to accommodate in the twilight of their years those men who served their Nation honorably and well.

Established in 1851, the Home today occupies what is in effect a large and beautiful park, adjacent to a closely built-up area of Washington. Its tract of 500 acres of high, rolling land overlooks the city, some three miles from the Capitol. There are dormitories for the members, a 378-bed hospital, quarters for administrative personnel and some of the staff, a mess hall, chapel, theater, laundry and power plant, and all the usual service installations. A herd of 200 Holsteins grazes on the Home grounds, providing milk for the dining hall tables. A large poultry farm produces eggs and chickens for the messes while flowers for the hospital come from the Home's own greenhouse. All this has been provided out of money contributed by soldiers during their active service years. Here, without expense to the Federal Government, "the Army takes care of its own."

The Home was established in 1851 by Act of Congress, with an initial grant of \$100,000 from reparations levied on the City of Mexico by General Winfield Scott in the course of the Mexican War. As a source of continuing revenue, the Congress provided that court-martial fines and forfeitures paid by soldiers should accrue to the credit of the Home. A deduction of 25 cents a month from the pay of male warrant officers and enlisted personnel has been authorized—and was at one


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*COLONEL D. C. CORDINER, U. S. Army, Retired, is Deputy Governor. United States Soldiers' Home.*

time deducted—but currently only 10 cents of this amount is being collected. There are other minor sources of income. The monies thus accumulated have been placed in a permanent trust fund on which the United States Treasury pays three per cent interest. The fund has provided for capital outlays and operating expenses and a comfortable surplus has been accumulated for emergency use.

Supervision and financial administration are vested in a Board of Commissioners consisting of the Governor of the Home and, representing the Department of the Army, The Adjutant General, Judge Advocate General, Surgeon General, Chief of Finance, Chief of Engineers and Quartermaster General. The Board reports to the Congress through the Secretary of the Army. Officers of the Home—Governor, Deputy Governor, Secretary-Treasurer, all on the retired list of the Regular Army—are appointed by the President of the United States on the recommendation of the Board of Commissioners of the Home. The Quartermaster and the Secretary of the Board, also retired Regular Army personnel, are appointed by the Board of Commissioners.

The average age of residents now at the Home is just over 66. Most took part in one or more of the Nation's wars, from the Indian Wars down to World War II. There are members still in their thirties and forties—a decided minority. Pre-



The main approach to the Soldiers' Home is known as the "Eagle Gate."

dominantly this is an elderly group of men and the pace at the Home is appropriately geared to suit them.

The avowed purpose of the Soldiers' Home is to provide "an honorable and comfortable refuge for the old, wounded and disabled soldiers of the Regular Army of the United States." Admission, granted under authority of the Board of Commissioners, is contingent upon service in the Regular Army or Air Force, as a warrant officer or as an enlisted man. Time spent on active duty with the Navy or Marine Corps, or as a commissioned officer, is not qualifying. However, service in a volunteer or reserve component of the Army or Air Force is credited in computing total length of service.

Entitlement may be by reason of 20 years or more of honorable and faithful service, or because the soldier is incapable of earning his own livelihood due to wounds or sickness incurred in line of duty. Admission also may be granted for such non-service-connected disability (including sickness and old age) as rules out the possibility of self-support.

The members of the Home are not derelicts and misfits, but a highly self-respecting group. Most of them have had Regular Army service upwards of ten years. Career soldiers all, they have known discipline and they have not forgotten their soldierly ways.

There are members who have come to the Home because they are old or ill and who have no family ties remaining; others may still have relatives but prefer the independence and companionship which the Home offers. Old soldiers still have their pride. This is their Home, where they are welcome and where they have earned the right to be.

Accommodations are comfortable but not luxurious. They are the best that can be arranged in existing buildings. A few of the members have rooms of their own. The rest live in two-, three-, four-, six-, and eight-man squad rooms. Some modernization has been undertaken, such as installation of modern washrooms, but much remains to be done. Added barracks capacity is urgently needed as the Home has a long waiting list.


While most members are receiving retirement pay or a pension, those without any other source of income are given \$5 pocket money monthly. For those who wish to work, paid jobs are available but this is not obligatory. Members of the Home have already done their work and have done it well.

The atmosphere of the Home is more like that of a club than an institution. There is, of course, an orderly routine, essential when any large group lives together. However this is not distasteful to men who have been used to leading regulated lives.

Little is required of members. They police their rooms and must make their beds by 0800 daily. They are held to a reasonable standard of personal neatness. Each Saturday morning there is a formal quarters inspection at which blue civilian suits are worn. Civilian clothing, incidentally, is available for free issue, and laundry and dry cleaning services are provided without charge. A pass system is in effect and leave is granted up to 30 days, longer in exceptional cases.

First sergeants on paid duty are in charge of barracks and some of the public rooms. Like any first sergeants worth their salt, they are expected to deal with most situations that arise. Old soldiers, just like younger soldiers, sometimes get into trouble. The first sergeants have no authority to impose punishment. In the few cases requiring discipline, the Deputy Governor acts as summary court officer. Any member may, of course, refuse punishment, in which case he is dropped from the rolls. Discipline presents no serious problem.

There are many ways in which members may spend their time pleasantly. A well-stocked library is regularly supplied



Built of white marble in Norman architectural style, the Scott building, completed in 1854, houses 235 members. Its clock tower is a Washington landmark.





Forwood, the hospital building, was built in 1873. Additions were completed in 1900.

with new books, magazines and jig-saw puzzles. A writing alcove is adjacent to the billiard room. The card and game rooms and the radio room where baseball scores are posted are especially popular. A combination snack bar and exchange is operated as a concession. In the recently renovated and air-conditioned theater the latest motion pictures are shown four times weekly. The theater has television equipment with an oversize screen. There are well-equipped shops for members who have an interest in hobbies. A few members play golf on the Home's nine-hole course; others play on the Home's softball team. A civilian band conducts outdoor concerts during the Summer months and a civilian orchestra plays indoors during the Winter. Religious services are held in the chapel by the two chaplains on the staff.

The mess hall, large enough to accommodate the entire membership at one sitting, has tables seating six each. The staff of waitresses can serve a meal within seven minutes. With the present mess allowance of 74½ cents a day, excellent meals are prepared under the supervision of an expert dietitian. The immaculate kitchen contains all necessary equipment for


the large-scale preparation of food. Adjoining are an ice-cream plant, refrigeration facilities and a complete bakery.

A superior Home hospital has a medical staff of ten including the chief surgeon (a retired brigadier general of the Army Medical Corps), three Medical Corps officers on active duty, a resident and three interns detailed from the Walter Reed Army Hospital, and two consultants. A dental surgeon is also detailed from Walter Reed. The nursing care is in the hands of fifteen Sisters of Charity, who are assisted by some 200 civilian maintenance employees.

Major surgical cases are sent to Walter Reed; the mentally incapacitated are transferred to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington; and tubercular patients go to Fitzsimons Army Hospital, Denver, Colorado. All such cases are cared for at the expense of the Home.

Of approximately 330 members currently hospitalized at the Home, two-thirds are permanent patients, some chronically ill, others in advanced stages of sickness or in varying conditions of debility.

The hospital has its own mess. There is a small auditorium, equipped with television, where motion pictures are also shown.



The Grant building provides living quarters for 270 members and also houses the dining room. This white marble structure was completed in 1910.

Other recreational and social service activities are provided by the American Red Cross, with three full-time workers, assisted by Gray Ladies and an instructor in handicraft.

Any hospital where nearly all of the patients are old men could easily be a very dispiriting place. There is nothing grim about the hospital at the Home. The buildings are far from modern, but the wards are bright and cheerful; the patients are obviously contented and appreciative of the good care given them. Among those who have not given up their interest in life is Isaac Butler, former member of the 16th Infantry who, in 1906, lost both hands and his eyesight in a dynamite explosion. Another permanent patient is Louis Gedeon, holder of the Medal of Honor, awarded during the Philippine Insurrection when he was serving with the 19th Infantry.

An enlarged hospital plant is projected as part of a general expansion program. New structures to be built are a 200-bed ward building, a nurses' dormitory, a double set of quarters for married medical officers and an auditorium with a seating capacity of 350. This undertaking is incident to the general agreement recently reached between the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of the Army as to the future operation of the Home. The agreement provides that the Home will relinquish about 148 acres of land for the purpose of erecting a hospital and an administration building for the Veterans Administration and a District of Columbia hospital center.

The Secretary of the Army has recommended to the Congress that \$12 million of the Home's surplus funds be used for immediate construction, including the erection of new dormitories to house 850 members. In the permanent trust fund, \$20 million would be reserved for future construction.

As the result of relinquishing part of its land, the Home will be forced to abandon its dairy and poultry plant. The immediate availability of funds for construction is a decided benefit, however. The added dormitory space will make it possible not only to provide the present members with better housing through abandonment of dark basement rooms, but also to cut down the waiting time now required to enter the Home.

Proud of the fact that their Home is not maintained from public funds, the members are eager to see its benefits extended, in fulfillment of the all-embracing principle that "The Army takes care of its own."

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Photographs for this article provided by M/Sgt William H. Groat, Ret.

## ARMY LANDMARKS

### *Fort Benning*

During its 31 years of growth, Fort Benning—described as “America’s most complete Army post”—has risen from a wasteland to become the seventh largest community in Georgia.

In early autumn 1919, a small group of officers and enlisted men moved into a wooded area south of Columbus, Georgia, and pitched tents on the site destined to become the permanent home of the Infantry. Today Fort Benning’s 282 square miles comprise some of the best training terrain in the world, the climate being ideally suited to year-round outdoor troop activities.

Prior to and during World War II, the Infantry Center trained such battle-honored units as the 24th Infantry Regiment (which is now fighting in Korea), the 29th Infantry Regiment, the 3d Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 2d Armored Division and 10th Armored Division.

Here infantry doctrine for the individual soldier and for squads, platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, divisions and armies is formed. In this function, the Infantry School plays a prominent role. The Tactical department perfects battlefield techniques during peacetime; the Weapons department establishes unit firepower; the Automotive department trains mechanics and automotive technicians. Still another department—the Airborne—has already trained hundreds of thousands of Army paratroopers in its relatively short existence. Recently, the Airborne department shortened its course from five weeks to three weeks and increased the size of its classes.

Through the years Fort Benning has been the site of countless demonstrations, staged especially for laymen and visiting dignitaries getting a glimpse of America’s defense forces.

(Picture on back cover.)

Photo by the Infantry School



THE INFANTRY SCHOOL, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA.

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